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We provide a preference framework for situations in which \intentions matter." A
behavioral type describes the individual's observable characteristics and the individual's
personality. We de¯ne a canonical behavioral type space and provide a condition that
identi¯es collections of behavioral types that are equivalent to components of the canonical
type space. We also develop a reciprocity model within our framework and show how it
enables us to distinguish between strategic (or instrumental) generosity and true generosity.
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In many economic settings, knowing the physical consequences of the interaction is
not enough to determine its utility consequences. For example, Blount (1995) observes
that experimental subjects may reject an unfair division when another subject willingly
proposes it and yet might accept it when the other subject is forced to propose it. Hence,
individuals care not just about physical consequences but also about the intentions of those
around them. In this paper, we develop a framework for modeling intentions and how they
a®ect others' behavior.
We call our descriptions of intentions interdependent preference models (IPMs). In an
IPM, a person's ranking of social outcomes depends on the characteristics and personal-
ities of those around him. Characteristics are attributes such as the individual's wealth,
education or gender. Personalities describe how preferences respond to the characteristics
and personalities of others. Thus, the personality de¯nes a person's altruism, his desire
to conform, his willingness to reciprocate or his inclination to be spiteful. To understand
how our theory works, consider the following example.
Two individuals are to share a ¯xed sum of money. There are three possible outcomes:
the sum of money can be given to one or the other person or it can be shared equally.
There are two possible preferences for each player; either the player is sel¯sh (S) and ranks
getting the whole sum above sharing it equally or the player is generous (G) and ranks
sharing the sum above getting it all. Giving the whole sum to the opponent is always the
least preferred outcome.
There are 3 possible types for each person. Each type has the same characteristic and
therefore types di®er in their personalities only. The nicest type, 3, is generous irrespective
of the opponent's type. Type 1 is the least nice type and is generous only if the opponent
is type 3. Finally, type 2 is generous to all types other than type 1. The table below
summarizes the mapping from type pro¯les to preference pro¯les:
1 2 3
1 (G;G) (S;S) (S;S)
2 (G;G) (G;G) (S;S)
3 (G;G) (G;G) (G;G)
Generous or Sel¯sh
1We call such a table an IPM. Levine (1998) introduces the ¯rst example of an IPM
and uses it to address experimental evidence in centipede, ultimatum and public goods
experiments.
Three features of IPMs are noteworthy: ¯rst, a type describes relevant personality
attributes rather than information. These attributes determine both the person's and his
opponent's preferences over outcomes, not their beliefs over an uncertain state of nature.
To put it another way, IPM's do not incorporate asymmetric information (or interactive
knowledge); they only model interactive preferences. Each entry in the table describes the
preference the two individuals would have if they knew the other's type; the IPM does not
address the question whether an individuals knows the others' type.
Second, an IPM does not describe the available strategic choices; it is not a game. We
can study how Persons I and II above would play many di®erent games. We can also use
this IPM as the preference model for a competitive economy. Hence, IPMs describe only
the preference environment not the institutional setting.
Third, in an IPM, individuals have preferences over physical outcomes and these pref-
erences depend on the persistent personalities and characteristics of everyone involved, not
on observed or predicted behavior or beliefs. Hence, the interaction of these ¯xed person-
alities determines whether each person is generous or sel¯sh. Whether or not a person acts
sel¯shly on a given day or believes the other will act sel¯shly is relevant only to the extent
that these actions a®ect the physical outcome.
The last two observations highlight the main di®erences between IPMs and existing
models of reciprocity. In our approach, there is a clear separation between the underly-
ing preference framework (i.e., the IPM) and the particular institution (game, market).
Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti's (1989) and the many reciprocity models based on
their approach such as Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2006), Segal and Sobel (2007) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), model
preference interactions through a circular de¯nition that permits preferences to depend on
the very behavior (or beliefs about behavior) that they induce.
This circularity enables psychological games to accommodate many departures from
standard theory. Some of these departures fall outside the reach of IPMs. For example,
2Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti show how psychological games can model a preference
for being surprised or a preference for pandering to others' expectations. Such preferences
are best described within the context of the particular interaction and hence are di±cult
to model as IPMs.
Because IPMs a®ord a separation between preferences and institutions they are well
suited for analyzing economic design problems or for comparisons of institutions. Consider,
for example, the (complete information) implementation problem: let f be a social choice
rule (or performance criterion) that associates a set of outcomes with each pro¯le, µ, of
individual attributes. When is it possible to ¯nd a game form g such that all equilibrium
outcomes of the game (g;µ) are among the desirable outcomes f(µ) for every µ? Note
that the separation of the preference framework (i.e., the attributes µ) from the game
form is essential for analyzing such a problem. Without this separation, just stating the
implementation problem becomes a formidable task.
More generally, separating preferences from institutions is essential anytime we wish to
evaluate a particular institution or assess a speci¯c environmental factor: does the English
auction Pareto dominate the Dutch auction? Do prohibitions on resale enhance e±ciency?
Does greater monitoring increase e®ort? Questions such as these demand a performance
criterion over consequences that can be expressed without reference to speci¯c institutions.
In an IPM, a type maps the other person's types to preference pro¯les. Hence, the
de¯nition of a type is circular. Our ¯rst objective is to identify a criterion to determine
when this circularity is problematic and when it is not; that is, to identify when interde-
pendent preference types can be reduced to preference statements. To see how this can
be done, note that in the above example, the preference pro¯le associated with type 3
does not depend on the opponent's personality and therefore type 3 can describe himself
without any reference to his opponent's type. But once type 3 is identi¯ed, type 2 can
describe himself as a personality that is generous only to the personality that has just
been identi¯ed. Finally, type 1 can identify himself as someone who is generous to the two
personalities that have been identi¯ed so far and no one else. Hence, in the above exam-
ple, we can eliminate the circularity by restating each type as a hierarchy of preference
statements.
3We de¯ne the canonical type space for interdependent preferences as sequences of such
hierarchical preferences statements. In Theorem 1, we show that each component of the
canonical type space is an IPM. However, not every IPM is part of the canonical type
space. Theorem 2 provides a simple condition on IPMs, (validity) that guarantees that
an IPM is a component of the canonical type space. When a model fails validity, types
cannot be reduced to preference statements. To formalize this observation, we develop a
notion of communicability in a given language. We show that players can communicate
their type in the language of preferences if and only if the model is valid (Theorem 3).
As an application of our model, we de¯ne reciprocity and identify a class of valid
interdependent preference models with reciprocating types. To do this, we consider settings
in which preferences can be ranked according to their kindness. That is, we identify each
preference with a real number and interpret higher numbers as kinder preferences. For
example, assume xi is i's consumption and
V r(x1;x2) = u(x1) + ru(x2)
is the utility that person 1 enjoys if r is his preference. The IPM speci¯es how types
determine r. Let ±(t;t0) 2 [r; ¹ r] be the preference of type t when the opponent is type
t0. A higher r is a kinder preference. Type t is nicer than type t0 if t is kinder than t0 to
every opponent type; a type reciprocates if it is kinder to a nicer opponent. Hence, if ±
is increasing in the ¯rst argument, higher types are kinder. Then, if ± is also increasing
in the second argument, all types reciprocate. In Theorems 4 and 5 we characterize two
simple classes of reciprocity models.
Our canonical type space provides a foundation for valid IPMs that is analogous to
the Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) foundations for infor-
mational (Harsanyi) types. In the concluding section, we discuss the relationship between
our results and technically related issues in that literature. In particular, we discuss Berge-
mann and Morris (2009) and the literature on communication and consensus (Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1982), Cave (1983), Bacharach (1985), Parikh and Krasucki (1990)).
All proofs are in the appendix.
42. Behavioral Types
We assume that there is one other person whose type a®ects the decision-maker. The
two-person setting simpli¯es the notation and the extension to the n-person setting is
straightforward. A set of social outcomes A, a set of characteristics ­ and a collection of
preferences R on A characterizes the environment. For example, a social outcome could
be the quantity of a public good together with a division of its cost or a pair of individual
consumption levels. A characteristic might specify a player's occupation or education. The
triple (A;R;­) describes the underlying economic primitives.
We assume that A and ­ are compact metric spaces and that R is a nonempty and
compact set of continuous preference relations1 on A. An interdependent preference model
(IPM) is a triple M = (T;°;!) where T is the type space, ° is a function that assigns a
preference to each pair of types, and ! is a function that identi¯es the characteristic of
each type.
De¯nition: Let T be a compact metric space, ° : T £ T ! R and ! : T ! ­ be
continuous functions. Then, M = (T;°;!) is an interdependent preference model (IPM).
Example 1: Consider the following straightforward generalization of the example in the
introduction: there are three possible outcomes A = f(1;0);(0;1);(1= 2; 1= 2)g and two possi-
ble preferences for each player, R = fS;Gg, as described in the introduction. There are k
types, T = f1;:::;kg, who share the same characteristic and
°(i;j) =
½
G if i + j > k
S if i + j · k.
In the introduction, we discuss the case of k = 3.
Note that players face a symmetric set of social outcomes. We can easily extend the
analysis to asymmetric situations at the cost of complicating the notation. An alternative
(and simpler) way to incorporate asymmetry is to de¯ne °(t;t0) as a pair of preferences,
one for when the decision maker is assigned the role of agent 1 and another for when
1 A continuous preference relation on A is a complete and transitive binary relation R such that the
sets fy 2 AjyRxg;fy 2 AjxRyg are closed subsets of A.
5he is assigned the role of agent 2. With this modi¯cation, our model can be applied to
asymmetric situations.
For the IPM (T;°;!) the type pro¯le (t;t0) implies the preference pro¯le
¡(t;t0) := (°(t;t0);°(t0;t)) (1)
Below, we sometimes refer to an IPM (T;¡;!). In that case, it is understood that ¡
satis¯es (1) for some ° : T £ T ! R.
The function °(t;¢) : T ! R describes how the agent's preference changes as a function
of the opponent's type. Hence, °(t;¢) represents an agent's personality. Note, however,
that the type space T is not a primitive of the economic environment. Therefore, °(t;¢)
cannot serve as a satisfactory de¯nition of an agents' personality. To be meaningful, a
personality must be expressed in terms of the primitives (A;­;R). Next, we describe how
this can be done.
Types are hierarchies of preference statements. In round 0, each type reports a char-
acteristic (the characteristic of the type). In rounds n ¸ 1, each type reports a set of
preference pro¯les. The preference pro¯le (R;R0) is part of the round n report if, given
the opponent's report in all previous rounds, it is possible that the player has preference
R and his opponent has preference R0. Theorem 1 shows that when a collection of such
hierarchies satis¯es a straightforward consistency condition, it is an IPM.
Before providing the formal de¯nition, it is useful to illustrate the correspondence
between behavioral types and hierarchies of preference statements in Example 1. All types
in this example have the same characteristic and therefore there is nothing to report in
round 0. In round 1, each type reports the set of possible preference pro¯les given his
type. For types 1;:::;k ¡ 1, the preference pro¯le is either (G;G) or (S;S). Hence, types
1;:::;k ¡ 1 can report that both players will have identical preferences and that both the
generous and the sel¯sh preference pro¯le are possible. For type k (the most generous
type) we have k+t > k for all t. Therefore, the preference pro¯le is (G;G) when any type
is matched with k. Round 1 thus identi¯es the most generous personality (type k).
In round 2, each type reports two sets of preferences, one in response to the round-1
(opponent's) report f(G;G)g and one in response to the round-1 report f(G;G);(S;S)g. In
6response to f(G;G)g all types must report f(G;G)g. This follows from a basic consistency
requirement: if a player reports a single possible preference pro¯le (R;R0) in round n, then,
in all successive rounds, his opponent must report (R0;R) (i.e., the same preference pro¯le
with the roles permuted). There are three possible responses to f(G;G);(S;S)g: type k
reports f(G;G)g, types f2;:::;k ¡ 1g report f(G;G);(S;S)g and type 1 reports f(S;S)g.
Therefore, round 2 identi¯es type 1 as the least generous personality.
Continuing in this fashion, round 3 identi¯es the second most generous personality
(type k ¡ 1) and round 4 identi¯es the second least generous personality (type 2). After
k rounds, such hierarchical preference statements reveal all personalities in Example 1.
Note that agents report preference pro¯les rather than individual preferences. Individual's
types place restrictions not only on their own preference but also on the preferences of
their opponents. Hence, to permit the full generality of possible preference interactions, it
is necessary that hierarchical statements convey (sets of) preference pro¯les not just their
own preferences.2
To de¯ne personalities, we use the following notation and de¯nitions. When Xj is
a metric space for all j in some countable or ¯nite index set J, we endow £j2JXj with
the sup metric. For any compact metric space X, let HX be the set of all nonempty,
closed subsets of X and endow HX with the Hausdor® topology. For the compact metric
spaces X;Z let C(X;HZ) denote the set of all functions f : X ! HZ such that their
graph G(f) = f(x;z) 2 X £ Z jz 2 f(x)g is closed in X £ Z.3 We endow C(X;HZ) with
the following metric: d(f;g) = dH(G(f);G(g)), where dH is the Hausdor® metric on the
set of all nonempty closed subsets of X £ Z. We identify the function f : X ! Z with
the function ¹ f : X ! HZ such that ¹ f(x) = ff(x)g for all x 2 X. It is easy to verify
that such a function f is an element of C(X;HZ) if and only if f is continuous. We use
C(X;Z) ½ C(X;HZ) to denote the set of continuous functions from X to Z.
We let H denote HR£R, the collection of all closed subsets of preference pro¯les (closed
subsets of R £ R). Types are consistent preference response hierarchies. As illustrated
above, these hierarchies specify sets of preferences that are gradually re¯ned as more
2 In example 1 both agents have the same preference hence statements about agents' own preferences
are su±cient. However, this is not true in general. To identify certain personality types, it may be
necessary to convey information about the opponent's preference.
3 Hence, C(X;HZ) is the set of upper hemi-continuous correspondences from X to Z.
7detail about the opponent's personality is revealed. We ¯rst de¯ne the hierarchies and
then provide the appropriate consistency condition.
De¯nition: A collection of nonempty compact sets (£0;£1;:::) is a system of preference
response hierarchies if £0 = ­ and
£n ½ £n¡1 £ C(£n¡1;H)
for all n ¸ 1.
The entry µ0 2 £0 speci¯es a characteristic. The entry µ1 = (µ0;f1) speci¯es a
characteristic µ0 and a map f1 : £0 ! H that associates each opponent characteristic with
a set of preference pro¯les (the round 1 statements the example above). More generally,
the entry µk consists of the previous entry (µk¡1) and the function fk : £k¡1 ! H that
speci¯es for each µk¡1 of the opponent a set of possible preference pro¯les.
Not all preference response hierarchies identify meaningful personality types. To il-
lustrate this, assume there is a single characteristic. Then, we can omit round 0 and f1
is the set of possible preference pro¯les for a particular type. Assume that f1 = f(R;R0)g
and f2(f0
1) 6= f(R;R0)g for some f0
1 2 £1. In that case, µ2 = (f1;f2) is inconsistent:
the round 1 report says that only (R;R0) is possible while the round 2 report says that
there is some opponent (f0
1) that leads to a di®erent pro¯le. Conversely, suppose that
f1 = f(R;R0);( ^ R; ^ R0)g and f2(f0
1) = f(R;R0)g for all f0
1 2 £1. In that case, the round 1
report says that two preference pro¯les are possible ((R;R0) and ( ^ R; ^ R0)) but according to
f2, there is no f0
1 for the opponent such that ( ^ R; ^ R0) is a possible preference pro¯le. Again,






Next, assume that f1 = f(R;R0)g 2 £1 and f0
1 = f( ^ R; ^ R0)g 2 £1. Then, both types
report a single possible preference pro¯le. Since these two types may be matched, it
follows that those two preference pro¯les must coincide. Therefore, consistency requires
that (R;R0) = ( ^ R0; ^ R). (Recall that our notation omits player names; the ¯rst entry refers
to the player and the second to the opponent.) More generally, the intersection of any pair
f1 and f0
1 (with the entries permuted) must be non-empty.
8The next de¯nition below speci¯es the same two consistency requirements for all levels
of the hierarchy.
De¯nition: The system of preference response hierarchies (£0;£1;:::) is consistent if:








(ii) For all (µn¡1;fn);(µ0
n¡1;f0
n) 2 £n, there is (R;R0) 2 R £ R such that
(R;R0) 2 fn(µ0
n¡1) and (R0;R) 2 f0
n(µn¡1)
Given a consistent system of preference response hierarchies (£0;£1;:::), we de¯ne a
type as a sequence (f0;f1;:::) with the property that (f0;:::;fn) 2 £n. To qualify as a
component of the canonical type space, £ must satisfy an additional property. Every type
must generate a unique preference when confronted with any other type in the component
£. This means that for every pair of types (f0;f1;:::);(f0
0;f0
1;:::) it must be the case that
fn(f0
0;:::;f0
n¡1) converges to a singleton as n ! 1. Let µ(n) = (f0;f1;:::;fn) denote the
n¡truncation of the sequence µ = (f0;f1;:::).
De¯nition: Let (£0;£1;:::) be a consistent sequence of preference response hierarchies.
Let £ := fµ 2 £0 £
Q1
n=1 C(£n¡1;H)j µ(n) 2 £ng. Then £ is a component of behavioral
types if £ is compact and if for all µ;µ0 2 £ with µ = (f0;f1;:::)
T
n¸0 fn+1(µ0(n)) is a singleton
The canonical type space is the union of all the components of behavioral types. Let





is the canonical behavioral type space or simply the canonical type space. Note that each
element µ 2 F belongs to a unique component £ 2 I. Hence, I is a partition of F.
9For any £ 2 I, let ª : £££ ! R £ R denote the function that speci¯es a preference




fn+1(µ0(n)) for (f0;f1;:::) = µ
The function ª(µ;¢) is the personality of type µ. It describes how the player responds to
di®erent opponent personalities. Requirement (ii) in the de¯nition of consistency ensures
that the function Ã satis¯es the following symmetry condition.
ª(µ;µ0) = (R;R0) implies ª(µ0;µ) = (R0;R) (S)
If ª satis¯es (S), we say that ª is symmetric. We de¯ne Á : £ ! ­ £ C(£;S) as the
function that speci¯es, for every type µ 2 £, the characteristic of µ and the mapping µ
uses to assign preferences pro¯le to opponent types. Hence,
Á(µ) := (f0;ª(µ;¢))
Theorem 1: The function ª is continuous and symmetric and Á is a homeomorphism
from £ to Á(£).
It follows from Theorem 1 that any component £ 2 I is an (IPM): for a symmetric ª,
there is a Ã : £££ ! R such that ª(µ;µ0) = (Ã(µ;µ0);Ã(µ0;µ)). Then, since £ is compact
(by de¯nition) and Ã is continuous (by Theorem 1), it follows that every component of the
canonical type space is an IPM. We record this observation as a corollary.
Corollary: If £ 2 I, then (£;Ã;!) is an IPM.
103. Valid Models
Suppose the environment has a single characteristic and two possible preferences, a





This IPM is not an element of the canonical type space. To see why not, note that all
types have the same characteristic, there is nothing to report in round 0. The round 1 set
of possible preference pro¯les is f(a;a);(b;b)g for both players. Since round 1 statements
are identical for both types, all higher round statements must be identical as well. Hence,
for all n the function fn is constant (with value f(a;a);(b;b)g). The two types in this IPM
have identical preference response hierarchies.
The IPM in table 3 illustrates a case in which the IPM introduces a distinction between
types 1 and 2 that has no counterpart in terms of the model's primitives. Every preference
statement that holds for type 1 is also true for type 2. Therefore, we cannot express the
personalities of those two types as preference statements.
We can interpret the IPM in table 3 as an incomplete model. For example, it might
be that the model omits a type.
1 2 3
1 (a;a) (b;b) (b;a)
2 (b;b) (a;a) (a;a)
3 (a;b) (a;a) (a;a)
Table 4
In the IPM in table 4, type 3 always prefers a irrespective of the opponent's type. Type 2
accommodates this preference while type 2 does not. Hence, types 1 and 2 have di®erent
personalities, and can be distinguished through their response to type 3. The IPM depicted
in table 3 could be interpreted as table 4 with an omitted type.
Alternatively, it might be that the model has omitted a characteristic: if types 1 and
2 have di®erent characteristics (type 1 is wealthy, type 2 is poor) then the IPM in table 3
11is a component of the canonical type space: both types have preference a if the opponent's
has the same wealth and preference b otherwise.
The two interpretations have obviously very di®erent implications for applications. If
players' behavior depends on the opponent's wealth (an omitted characteristic) then the
observability of wealth is a key determinant of outcomes. If players' behavior depends on
their response to some third personality type (type 3) then observability of wealth should
have no e®ect and instead the observability of past play will a®ect outcomes. Since the
IPM is not a component of the canonical type space, we cannot express personalities in
terms of the underlying primitives of the model. As a result, we cannot determine how
information about the underlying primitives a®ects behavior.
Next, we provide a criterion (validity) that identi¯es whether or not an IPM is a
component of the canonical type space. A partition D of T is a pairwise disjoint collection
of non-empty subsets such that
S
D2D D = T. Let Dt denote the unique element of D
that contains t. The partition D = fftgjt 2 Tg is called the ¯nest partition. Let (T;°;!)
be an IPM. Recall that
¡(t;t0) := (°(t;t0);°(t0;t))
and de¯ne ¡(t;D) := f¡(t;t0)j t0 2 Dg.
De¯nition: The IPM (T;°;!) is valid if the ¯nest partition of T is the only partition
D that satis¯es
(i) t;t0 2 D 2 D implies !(t) = !(t0)
(ii) t0 2 Dt 2 D implies ¡(t;D) = ¡(t0;D) for all D 2 D.
Validity requires that it be impossible to partition the type space in a manner that
yields a partition element with multiple (indistinguishable) types. Theorem 2 shows that
any valid IPM corresponds to a component £ 2 I. Two IPM's (T;°;!), (T0;°0;!0) are
isomorphic if there exists a homeomorphism ¶ : T ! T0 such that !(t) = !0(¶(t)) and
°(s;t) = °0(¶(s);¶(t)) for all s;t 2 T.
Theorem 2: An interdependent preference model (T;°;!) is valid if and only if it is
isomorphic to a component of the canonical type space.
12We have interpreted the invalid IPM above as an incomplete model, either missing
types or missing characteristics. Note that any ¯nite invalid IPM can be \validated" by
adding new types or new characteristics. Any model is obviously valid if each type has
a distinct characteristic. For the missing types interpretation, it is easy to show that
any ¯nite, invalid IPM can be embedded in a valid IPM with a larger type space. More
precisely, assume that R contains at least 2 preferences and consider a ¯nite IPM (T;°;!).
Then, there exists a valid IPM ( ^ T; ^ °; ^ !) such that T ½ ^ T;°(t) = ^ °(t) for all t 2 T and
!(t) = ^ !(t) for all t 2 T.
4. Validity and Communicability
We have interpreted preference response hierarchies as players' conditional preference
statements that gradually reveal their type. Those hierarchies impose a particular protocol
of how these statements unfold. In this section, we show that no other protocol can do
better. More formally, we introduce a general framework for communication and show
that agents can reveal their types through communication if and only if the IPM is valid.
Hence, types are communicable if and only if the IPM is a component of the canonical
type space.
For simplicity, we assume that there is single characteristic4 and a ¯nite number of
behavioral types. To formulate a model of communication, we need to translate the IPM
into an epistemic model. An epistemic model is a ¯nite set of states S, a map º : S ! R£R
that associates a preference pro¯le with each state and a pair of partitions T1 and T2 of S
that represent the players' knowledge. Elements of Ti are player i's epistemic types.
Let (T;°) be an IPM with a single characteristic and a ¯nite set of types. In the
equivalent epistemic model, each player knows his own type and knows nothing about
his opponent's type; that is, any type in T possible. Formally, the epistemic model E =
fS;T1;T2;ºg is equivalent to the IPM (T;°) if there is a bijection ³i : T ! Ti such that
f¡(t;t0)g = º(³1(t) \ ³2(t0)) for all t;t0 2 T. The bijection ³i maps behavioral types (of
M) into epistemic types (of E) while preserving the resulting preference pro¯le. We refer
to E as an IPM in epistemic form (IPM-EF).
4 Extending the analysis below to IPMs with multiple characteristics is straightforward. We assume a
single characteristic to keep the notation simple.
13A collection of subsets K of a set S is an algebra (or equivalently, a language) if it
contains S and is closed under unions and complements. For any two algebras K;L, let
K _ L denote the smallest (in terms of set inclusion) algebra that contains both and let
K ^ L be the largest that is contained in both.
We call each A 2 L is a word. The primitives of an interactive preference model are
preference statements. Hence, the relevant language is the the language of preferences.5 A
subset A of S is a word in the language of preferences if A = fs 2 S jº(s) 2 V g for some
set of preference pro¯les V 2 H.
De¯nition: The language of preferences is Lp = fA ½ S jA = º¡1(V );V 2 Hg.
To illustrate these de¯nitions, we apply them to Example 1 from the previous section.
Example 10: (epistemic form) Let T = f1;:::;kg and de¯ne ° as in Example 1 above:
°(i;j) =
½
G if i + j > k
S if i + j · k
Then, de¯ne fS;T1;T2;ºg equivalent to (T;°) as follows: let S = f(i;j)ji 2 T;j 2 Tg
and º(i;j) = (°(i;j);°(j;i)) for all (i;j) 2 S. The information partitions are T1 =
ff(i;1);:::;(i;k)gji 2 Tg and T2 = ff(1;i);:::;(k;i)gji 2 Tg.
There are two possible preference pro¯les, fG;Gg and fS;Sg. Therefore, the language
of preferences has three non-empty words: A = f(i;j)ji + j > kg, B = f(i;j)ji + j · kg
and S = A [ B. The word A corresponds to f(G;G)g, B corresponds to f(S;S)g and
S = A [ B corresponds to f(S;S);(G;G)g.
A person with knowledge Ti can use the word A 2 L to make a statement about
whether or not he knows A. Let




Then, i can use the word A to communicate the words fTi ¤A;Ti ¤(SnA)g to j. These are
words derived from A and SnA that i understands; that is, at every s 2 S, i knows whether
5 The formalism developed here can be used to de¯ne communicability with respect to any given
language.
14or not Ti ¤ A and Ti ¤ (SnA)) applies (i.e., is true); he knows whether or not he knows
A and he knows whether or not he knows SnA. Then, using standard logical operations
he can also communicate other words such as [Sn(Ti ¤ A)] \ [Sn(Ti ¤ (SnA))]; i.e., that he
knows neither A nor SnA. We let
Ti ¤ L
denote the language that can be communicated in this way. That is, Ti ¤L is the smallest
algebra that contains Ti ¤ A for every A 2 L.6
Let ¤ be the collection of all algebras and let ¤p := fL 2 ¤jLp ½ Lg.7 De¯ne the
function F : ¤p ! ¤p as follows:
F(L) = L _ [T1 ¤ L] _ [T2 ¤ L]
Hence, F(L) is the re¯nement of L that results from one round of communication. We
can describe the function F for the example above. Let L be the language of preferences
consisting of the words A = f(i;j) : i + j > kg;B = f(i;j) : i + j · kg and A [ B. Then,
the partition in the ¯gure below generates the algebra F(L). As the ¯gure shows, the word
B remains unchanged whereas the word A is partitioned into 3 separate words.







6 It is easy to verify that Ti ¤ L is contained in any algebra that contains Ti. That is, in any language
i can only communicate a coarsening of his knowledge.
7 The set ¤ is a lattice under the binary relation ½ and ¤p is a sublattice.
15Let L1 = Lp and inductively de¯ne Ln+1 = F(Ln). Players can continue communicat-
ing until they reach a ¯xed point of F. Since S is ¯nite, there is n such that F(Ln) = Ln.
Let L¤ denote this ¯xed point. Through this process, players can communicate the algebra
Cp := [T1 ¤ L¤] _ [T2 ¤ L¤]
Then, a collection of subsets M of S is communicable if only if M ½ Cp.
In the sequence L1;L2;::: players communicate all information in each round. Con-
sider any other sequence ^ L1; ^ L2;::: starting at the same initial point ^ L1 = Lp such that in
each round agents exchange some (but not necessarily all) of their information until they
reach a situation in which they have nothing new to convey. This process will re¯ne the
language until a ¯xed point ^ L of F is reached. We claim that ^ L = L¤. To see this, observe
that F is a monotone function, that is,
L0 ½ L00 implies F(L0) ½ F(L00)
Applied to the ¯xed point ^ L, the equation above implies F(L) ½ ^ L if L ½ ^ L. Since
L1 ½ ^ L, we conclude that Ln ½ ^ L for all n and therefore L¤ ½ ^ L. That ^ L ½ L¤ follows
from the fact that ^ Ln ½ Ln for all n (by construction). Hence, L¤ = ^ L and L¤ is the
outcome any communication protocol. A particular collection of subsets is communicable
in Lp if this collection is contained in Cp. We wish to characterize when players' types are
communicable.
De¯nition: An IPM (S;T1;T2;º) in epistemic form is communicable in language Lp if
Ti ½ Cp for i = 1;2.
An IPM is communicable if players can express their types in the language of pref-
erences. Theorem 3 below shows that validity identi¯es exactly those models that can be
communicated.
Theorem 3: A ¯nite IPM in epistemic form is communicable in the language of prefer-
ences if and only if it is equivalent to a valid IPM.
We interpret communicability as a test that a well-de¯ned, self-contained model of
interdependent preferences types must satisfy: responding to the opponent's personality
16requires understanding his personality and each player's understanding is the sum of what
he knows at the outset (i.e., his type) and what he can learn through communication
with the other player.8 A model that violates this communicability test can, at best, be
interpreted as an incomplete model: players respond to personality types that are well
de¯ned in a larger context (in a richer model) but ill-de¯ned in the IPM at hand.
5. Reciprocity
A reciprocating personality9 is one that is kinder to nicer opponents. Hence, in our
formal de¯nition of reciprocity, we assume an exogenous \kindness" ranking on preferences.
The literature often assumes that individuals have exogenously speci¯ed sel¯sh utilities
and identi¯es altruism (or generosity or kindness) with the relative weight a person puts
on other's sel¯sh utility. For example, let (x;y) 2 A = [0;100] £ [0;100] be the vector
consumptions and assume that sel¯sh utilities are linear. Then, let Ur such that
Ur(x;y) = x + ry
be the utility function representing preference with parameter r 2 [¡1;1]. A natural
kindness order on these preferences is the \¸" ranking of their parameters. That is, the
preference (with parameter) r is kinder than the preference r0 if and only if r ¸ r0.
More generally, we assume that there is a continuous one-to-one function ¿ : R ! I R
and interpret ¿(R) ¸ ¿(R0) to mean R is kinder than R0. We say that M is an ordered IPM
when such ¿ exists. When the IPM is ordered, it is convenient to identify each preference
R with ¿(R) and suppress preferences. Then, we let ± = ¿ ± ° and refer to (T;±) as an
ordered IPM.
De¯nition: In an ordered IPM, type t is nicer than type t0 if ±(t;t00) ¸ ±(t0;t00) for all
t00; type t reciprocates if ±(t;t0) ¸ ±(t;t00) whenever t0 is nicer than t00. An ordered IPM is a
reciprocity model if it is valid, the niceness relation is complete and every type reciprocates.
8 Since we wish to identify what can be understood in principle, we are ignoring incentives. In practice,
an agent may learn less than Cp since his opponent may strategically withhold information.
9 For simplicity, we assume throughout this section that all types have the same characteristic and
hence use type and personality interchangeably.
17This de¯nition incorporates both positive and negative reciprocity.10 Let r¤ be a
reference level of fairness and let
±(e(t);t) = r¤
Type t's opponent exceeds the reference level of fairness whenever t0 ¸ e(t). So, type t
exhibits positive reciprocity if ±(t;¢) is °at or nearly °at when t0 < e(t) but steep when
t0 > e(t). Thus, type t reciprocates when opponent types are nicer than the threshold
e(t) but does not reciprocate when opponent types are below e(t). Conversely, type t
exhibits negative reciprocity if ±(t;¢) is steep when t0 < e(t) but °at when t0 > e(t). Thus,
type t reciprocates when opponent types are less nice than the threshold e(t) but does not
reciprocate when opponent types are above e(t).
The simplest kind of an ordered IPM is one in which types are also real numbers. In
such a model, if ± is increasing in the ¯rst argument, then bigger types are nicer. If it
is also increasing in the second argument, then all types reciprocate. Theorem 4 shows
that adding a mild genericity condition to such a model ensures validity. The theorem also
shows that, in fact, all reciprocity models are of this kind.
De¯nition: The ordered IPM (T;±) is simple if T ½ I R; a simple IPM is increasing if ±
is nondecreasing in both arguments and ±(t;¢) = ±(t0;¢) implies t = t0.
Theorem 4: An ordered IPM is a reciprocity model if and only if it is isomorphic to
some simple increasing IPM.
To prove Theorem 4, we ¯rst show that validity together with the continuity and com-
pactness properties of IPMs ensure that the types in a reciprocity model can be identi¯ed
with real numbers. For the converse, we show that if ± is nondecreasing in both argu-
ments, then the simple IPM (T;±) is valid if and only if ± satis¯es the genericity condition
(t;¢) = ±¤(t0;¢) implies t = t0. Hence, the nondecreasingness of ± ensures that each type in
a simple model is reciprocating and given the nondecreasingness, the genericity condition
is exactly what is needed for a simple model to be valid.
Next, we examine the special case of an ordered IPM with two possible preference
pro¯les. Hence, we identify R with f0;1g where 1 is the generous (i.e., kinder) preference,
10 Dohmen, Falk, Hu®man and Sunde (2009) show that positive reciprocating people (i.e., types) enjoy
better job market outcomes and more life satisfaction than negative reciprocating types.
180 is the sel¯sh preference and assume that ±(t;t0) = (0;0) or ±(t;t0) = (1;1) for all t;t0 2 T.
We call such models binary IPMs.
As we show in Theorem 5 below, there are only two classes of valid binary IPMs. Both
classes consist of simple increasing IPMs and hence are reciprocity models. In the ¯rst
class, the highest type is generous irrespective of the opponent's type and all opponents
are generous when matched with the nicest type. Example 1 belongs to this class. Let
±m(i;j) =
n
1 if i + j > m
0 otherwise
Let K = f1;:::;kg be the set of types. Then, M0
k = (K;±k) is the ¯rst class of binary
IPMs. In the second class, the lowest type is always sel¯sh irrespective of the opponent's
type and all opponents are sel¯sh when they are matched with the lowest type. This class
of binary IPMs is M1
k = (K;±k+1) for k = 1;:::. Theorem 5 shows that these are the only
valid binary IPMs.
Theorem 5: A binary IPM is valid if and only if it is isomorphic to some Mi
k.
It is easy to verify that every Mi
k is a reciprocity model. Hence, Theorem 5 establishes
that valid IPMs are reciprocity models. To gain intuition for Theorem 5, ¯rst note that,
by compactness and continuity, a binary reciprocity model must have a ¯nite number of
types f1;:::;mg. If m = 1, there is nothing to prove. Suppose the result is true whenever
m = k and let m = k + 1. Since there are only two preference pro¯les, validity ensures
that ±(t;¢) is constant for some type t. Suppose this constant is 1 and without loss of
generality let t = k + 1. Then, we show that the validity of (f1;:::;k + 1g;±) implies
that (f1;:::;kg;±) is valid and that there exists no t · k such that ±(t;¢) = 1. Then,
by the inductive hypothesis, the restriction of ± to f1;:::;kg must be ±k+1, implying that
± = ±k+1.
5.1 Modeling Intentions with IPMs
As we noted in the introduction, IPMs are not adequate for modeling all departures
from the standard framework. By the standard framework, we mean what Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2006) call the \consequentialistic perspective," that is, any model in which the
physical description of outcomes is su±cient for identifying utility outcomes. Even some
19forms of reciprocity may fall outside of the reach of IPMs. For example, a player may
care only about whether or not another player acted generously and not about the other
player's (persistent) personality.11
However, when modeling intentions, identifying persistent attributes as the carriers of
utility has some advantages. We considered one of those advantages in the introduction:
the implied separation of preferences from institutions facilitates the analysis of economic
design problems. Here, we will discuss a second advantage: it enables reciprocity models
to di®erentiate between acting generously out of self-interest and genuine kindness.
Berg, Dickhuat and McCabe (1995) provide experimental evidence indicating that
(i) subjects often act generously towards others and trust them to reciprocate and (ii)
this trust/generocity is often rewarded. Berg, Dickhuat and McCabe consider factors that
might facilitate such trust and reciprocity. Our goal in this subsection is to suggest a
novel experiment that would enable the experimenter to determine if this trust/generocity
re°ects genuine concern for the opponent or if it is strategic and motivated by the expec-
tation of reciprocity. Then, we show how our theory might be useful for organizing the
results of such an experiment.
Consider the following game: player 1 is either generous/trusts (g) player 2 or he does
not (s). Afterwards, nature chooses either 0 or 1. If nature chooses 0, the game ends. The
outcome (g;0) yields (70;30); that is, 70 dollars for player 1 and 30 dollars for player 2
while (s;0) yields (80;0). If nature chooses 1, then player 2 chooses an action; she either
accepts player 1's decision (a) or declines it (d). The outcomes (g;0) and (g;1;a) yield
the monetary payo®s (70;30) while (s;0) and (s;1;a) yield the monetary payo®s (80;0).
If player 2 chooses d, she gets 40 dollars and player 1 gets 0 dollars. That is, (g;1;d) and
(s;1;d) both yield the monetary payo®s (0;40). Let ® 2 (0;1) be the probability that
nature chooses 1.
Consider how changing ® might a®ect behavior. First, let ® be close to 1. Then, if
player 1 chooses s and nature chooses 1, player 2 is likely to choose d: by choosing s, player
1 has shown no generocity/trust and therefore player 2 is likely to be ungenerous as well.
Knowing this, player 1 believes he is likely to get 0 if he chooses s. Hence, when ® is high,
11 Falk and Fischbacher's (2006) de¯nition of reciprocity re°ects this view.
20player 1 will be inclined to choose g even if he puts no weight 2's well-being. Thus, player
1's generocity/trust in this case may be strategic.
In contrast, when ® is close to zero, the action g reveals a genuinely generous player
1; had he chosen s, he would have (almost) guaranteed himself 80 and he is giving this up
for player 2's bene¯t. Therefore, conditional on the node (g;1) being reached, we would
expect player 2 to be more inclined to honor player 1's trust when ® is low than when it
is high.
Thus, when ® is close to 0, g is proof of player 1's good intentions (i.e., that he is
type 2) and is fully rewarded. When ® is close to 1, g can mean that player 1 has good
intentions or that he would like player 2 to think he has good intentions. The possibility
that player 1's generosity is not genuine should make player 2's less reciprocating.
To see how a reciprocity model can match the intuition outlined above, we will model
preferences with the binary IPM M0
2 de¯ned in the previous section. To be concrete, let
r 2 f0;1g be the preference that Ur below represents:
Ur(x;y) = x + ry
Then, consider the IPM (f1;2g;±), where
±(t;t0) = 1 if and only if t + t0 > 2:
Assume that both players are drawn from the same population with 10% type 2's.
For ® su±ciently small, the game above has a unique equilibrium: player 1 chooses g if
and only if he is type 2 and player 2 always accepts g and accepts s if and only if she is
type 2. For ® close to 1, the game again has a unique equilibrium: player 1 chooses g for
sure if he is type 2 and randomizes between g and s if he is type 1. Player 2 accepts g for
sure if she is type 2 and randomizes between a and d if she is type 2.
These two equilibria match the intuition above exactly: if ® is close to 0, choosing g is
unambiguously generous and such generosity is rewarded. If ® is close to 1, both generosity
and self-interest are possible motives for choosing g and therefore player 2's response is
more quali¯ed; sometimes she reciprocates and sometimes she doesn't.
21With interdependent preferences, di®erent game forms create di®erent incentives to
reveal (or conceal) intentions. Understanding the behavioral consequences of a particu-
lar institution or environmental factor, then, amounts to understanding the incentives it
creates for signalling intentions.
6. Related Literature on Belief (or Possibility) Hierarchies
That each types can be identi¯ed with a unique hierarchy of preference statements
is a central property of our model. The same objective { relating di®erences in types to
di®erences in payo® relevant primitives { can also be pursued when types are exogenous pa-
rameters.12 Bergemann and Morris (2007), (2009) and Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi
(2010) establish that this question plays a central role in implementation theory. Berge-
mann and Morris (2007) permits asymmetric information (i.e., players form conjectures
over their opponents' preference types) and they prove two results in which conditions
similar to validity play a role.
To facilitate the comparison, we consider ¯nite, symmetric two-person IPMs with
a single characteristic.13 Each pair of types yields a pair of von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities on Z, the set of all lotteries over outcomes. Let (T;°) be an IPM satisfying
these conditions and assume that the two agents are playing an arbitrary two-person game
G = fA1;A2;gg, where g : A1 £ A2 ! Z. Hence, Ai is player i's pure strategy set and
g is the outcome function that relates pure strategy pro¯les to lotteries over outcomes.
Bergemann and Morris make a mild genericity assumption: given any belief over opponent
types and actions, no type is ever indi®erent over all of his own actions.
Bergemann and Morris de¯ne rationalizable actions as follows: each round, players
are allowed any conjecture over opponent types and allowed actions for those types. Then,
actions that are never best responses for a type against all such conjectures are eliminated
and become no longer unavailable for that type. Actions that are never eliminated are
rationalizable. Bergemann and Morris (2007) call two types strategically equivalent if
12 For example, Ely and Peski (2006) point out that in standard models of incomplete information,
two di®erent types may have exactly the same hierarchy of beliefs. See also Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris
(2006a), (2006b) for related work. In an earlier version of this paper (Gul and Pesendorfer (2005)), we
show that an IPM is valid if and only if each type is uniquely identi¯ed through its possibility hierarchy.
The latter concept is due to Mariotti, Meier and Piccione (2005).
13 Bergemann and Morris (2007) allow for arbitrary ¯nite n¡person IPMs.
22they have the same set of rationalizable actions in every game. To relate their Proposition
5 to our analysis of communicability, we present the following stronger notion of validity:
De¯nition: The IPM (T;°;!) is strongly valid if the ¯nest partition of T is the only
partition D that satis¯es
(i) t;t0 2 D 2 D implies !(t) = !(t0)
(ii) t0 2 Dt 2 D implies °(t;D) = °(t0;D) for all D 2 D.
The di®erence between validity and strong validity is that ° replaces ¡ in the latter.
Hence, strong validity would be the appropriate concept for Theorem 1 (or Theorem 3) if
each player were restricted to making statements about his own preferences. We can now
state Proposition 5 of Bergemann and Morris (2007) as follows:
Proposition: If (°;T) satis¯es the genericity condition above and fails strong validity,
then there are at least two equivalent types in T.
We can relate the result above to Theorem 3 as follows: if two types cannot distinguish
themselves through any (truthful) preference statement, then they certainly cannot distin-
guish themselves through their strategic behavior. Of course, a type may have knowledge
about preferences that is not strategically relevant, for example, he may know facts about
his opponent's preferences that the opponent does not know. Hence, validity is not enough
to rule out strategically equivalent types but the failure of validity ensures that there are
strategically equivalent types.
While formally related, Theorem 3 and the proposition above have di®erent objectives
and interpretations. Theorem 3 asks if a particular IPM can be interpreted as a legiti-
mate, non-circular description of individuals' attitudes toward each other. It identi¯es
the following test: for an IPM to be valid, given any type pro¯le, there should be some
sequence of statements (about preferences) that would enable both players to ¯gure out
their opponents' types. Hence, we interpret validity as a constraint on the modeler; IPMs
that fail validity will have types that cannot be distinguished except through the arbitrary
notational devices of the modeler.
In contrast, Bergemann and Morris have in mind situations in which types have clear
meaning; that is, they view types as privately observed characteristics. For example,
23suppose there are two kinds of two-way radios (A and B). Suppose also that the two
players derive utility only if both have the same kind of radio and invest a dollar to
activate their radios. Hence, there are two outcomes, activate (1) and don't activate (0).
When a type A confronts a type A or a type B confronts a type B, both prefer 1 to 0.
Otherwise, both prefer 0 to 1. In this example, if we interpret A and B as types rather
than characteristics validity fails. The proposition above implies that both types will have
exactly the same set of rationalizable strategies in every game. This does not mean that
the model is in any sense ill-de¯ned; being type A or B has a clear meaning in this model.
However, as Bergemann and Morris show, no social choice rule that treats types A and B
di®erently can be robustly implemented.14
Aumann (1976) shows that in a ¯nite asymmetric information model with a common
prior if the posteriors are common knowledge, then they must be identical. Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1982) investigate how posteriors might become common knowledge.
They show that if two agents exchange information by sequentially revealing their current
probability assessments (of a particular event), then, eventually, these assessments will be-
come common knowledge (and hence, common if the priors are common as well) whenever
a mild genericity condition is satis¯ed. The subsequent literature on communication and
consensus extends this result in the following ways: the function being communicated is
not just priors but an arbitrary mapping from the set of all events,15 there are more than
two communicating agents and explicit, general protocols determining who speaks when.16
In these papers, the medium of communication; that is, the language is an arbitrary
function g : 2Snf;g ! Y such that
g(E) = g(E0); E \ E0 = ; implies g(E [ E0) = g(E) (C)
Agents take turns announcing g(E) to some subset of other agents, where E ½ S is the
smallest event that the agent knows to be true given all that he has heard before. These
14 Bergemann and Morris' main theorem shows that a condition stronger than strong validity is neces-
sary and su±cient to ensure that for any distinct t;t0, there exist some game G in which set of rationalizable
strategies of t and t0 are disjoint. They show that the latter property plays a key role in robust implemen-
tation with simultaneous mechanisms.
15 See for example, Cave (1983) and Bacharach (1985).
16 See Parikh and Krasucki (1990).
24papers identify conditions on g and the protocol that ensure that eventually all agents
have the same knowledge about the value of g. Despite the absence of priors in our model,
some comparisons between Theorem 3 and the results in this literature are possible. Our
language of preferences yields the following function g:
g(E) = fº(s)js 2 Eg
Thus, an agent who knows the event E, knows that the true preference pro¯le is in g(E).
This g satis¯es the convexity condition (C) above. The standard consensus result of the
literature corresponds to the assertion that T1 ¤G(L) = T2 ¤G(L); that is, once communi-
cation stops the two agents have the same knowledge about preferences (i.e., the function
g). Note that our focus is on whether types can be communicated in the language of
preferences rather than whether communicating in the language of preferences eventually
leads to agreement about preferences.
Our notion of communication is more permissive than the Caves-Bacharach-Parikh
and Krasucki model of communication protocols. Our modeling has the e®ect of per-
mitting conditional statements such as \had you told me x, I would have said y." A
communication protocol does not permit such statements. Hence, our version of com-
munication always leads to (weakly) more \knowledge sharing" than any communication
protocol. Furthermore, there are examples in which our model can convey knowledge that
cannot be conveyed through all possible protocols.
7. Appendix
Let Z be a compact metric space. For any sequence An 2 HZ, let
limAn = fz 2 Z jz = limzn for some sequence zn such that zn 2 An for all ng
limAn = fz 2 Z jz = limznj for some sequence znj such that znj 2 Anj for all jg
Let X be a metric space and p : X ! HZ. We say that p is Hausdor® continuous if it is a
continuous mapping from the metric space X to the metric space HZ. Note that if p is a
Hausdor® continuous mapping from X to HZ, then p 2 C(X;HZ). However, the converse
is not true.
25Lemma 1: Let X;Y;Y 0;Z be nonempty compact metric spaces, q 2 C(X £ Y;Z), p 2
C(Y 0;HY ), and r 2 C(Y 0;Y ). Then, (i) An 2 HZ converges to A (in the Hausdor®
topology) if and only if limAn = limAn = A. (ii) xn 2 X converges to x implies q(xn;B)
converges to q(x;B) for all B 2 HY . (iii) If q¤(x;y0) = q(x;p(y0)) for all x 2 X;y0 2 Y 0
then q¤ 2 C(X £ Y 0;HZ). (iv) If r is onto, then r¡1 2 C(Y;HY 0).
Proof: Part (i) is a standard result. See Brown and Pearcy (1995).
(ii) Suppose xn 2 X converges to x. Let znj 2 q(xnj;B) such that limznj = z. Hence,
znj = q(xnj;ynj) for some ynj 2 B. Since B is compact, we can without loss of generality
assume ynj converges to some y 2 B. Hence, the continuity of q ensures z = q(x;y)
and therefore z 2 q(x;B) proving that limq(xn;B) ½ q(x;B). If z 2 q(x;B), then there
exists y 2 B such that z = q(x;y). Since q is continuous, we have z = limq(xn;y).
Hence, q(x;B) ½ limq(xn;B). Since, limq(xn;B) ½ limq(xn;B) ½ q(x;B), we conclude
limq(xn;B) = q(xn;B) = limq(xn;B) as desired.
(iii) Suppose (xn;y0
n) converges to (x;y) and zn 2 q¤(xn;y0
n) converges to z. Pick
yn 2 p(y0
n) such that q(xn;yn) = zn. Since Y is compact, we can assume that yn converges
to some y. Since p 2 C(Y 0;HY ), we conclude that y 2 p(y0) and since q is continuous,
q(x;y) = z. Therefore, z 2 q¤(x;y0), proving that q¤ 2 C(X £ Y;HZ).
(iv) The continuity and ontoness of r ensures that r¡1 maps Y into hY 0. Assume that
yn converges to y, y0
n 2 r¡1(yn) and y0
n converges to y0. Then, r(y0
n) = yn for all n and by
continuity r(y0) = y. Therefore, y0 2 r¡1(y) as desired.
Lemma 2: Let X and Z be compact metric spaces. Suppose pn 2 C(X;HZ) and
pn(x) ½ pn+1(x) for all n ¸ 1, x 2 X. Let p(x) :=
T
n¸1 pn(x) and assume p(x) is a
singleton for all x 2 X. Then, (i) p is continuous and (ii) pn converges to p.
Proof: Obviously,
T
n¸1 G(pn) = G(p). Since pn 2 C(X;HZ) and X;Z are compact, so is
G(pn). Therefore G(p) is compact (and therefore closed) as well. Since p is a function and
both X;Z are compact, the fact that p has a closed graph implies that p is continuous.
To prove (ii), it is enough to show that if Gn is a sequence of compact sets such that
Gn+1 ½ Gn then Gn converges (in the Hausdor® topology) to G :=
T
n Gn. If not, since
G1 is compact, we could ¯nd ² > 0 and yn 2 Gn converging to some y 2 G1 such that
26d(yn;G) > ² for all n. Hence, d(y;G) ¸ ² and therefore there exists k such that y = 2 Gk for
all n ¸ k. Choose ²0 > 0 such that miny02Gk d(y0;y) ¸ ²0 and k0 such that n ¸ k0 implies
d(yn;y) < ²0=2. Then, for n ¸ maxfk;k0g we have d(yn;y) ¸ ²0 and d(yn;y) < ²0=2, a
contradiction.
We say that pn 2 C(X;HZ) converges to p 2 C(X;HZ) uniformly if for all ² > 0,
there exists N such that n ¸ N implies d(pn(x);p(x)) < ². Let X be an arbitrary set
and Z be a compact metric space. Given any two functions p;q that map X into HZ, let
d¤(p;q) = supx2X d(p(x);q(x)), where d is the Hausdor® metric on HZ.
Lemma 3: (i) If pn 2 C(X;HZ) converges to p 2 C(X;Z), then pn converges to p
uniformly; that is, limn d¤(pn;p) = 0. (ii) The relative topology of C(X;Z) ½ C(X;HZ) is
the topology of uniform convergence.
Proof: Let limpn = p 2 C(X;Z). Then, p is continuous and since X is compact, it is
uniformly continuous. For ² > 0 choose a strictly positive ²0 < ² such that d(x;x0) < ²0
implies d(p(x);p(x0)) < ². Then, choose N so that dH(G(p);G(pn)) < ²0 for all n ¸ N.
Hence, for n ¸ N, x 2 X and z 2 pn(x), we have x0 2 X such that d(x;x0) < ²0 and
d(p(x0);z) < ²0. Hence, d(p(x);z) · d(p(x0);z) + d(p(x0);p(x)) < 2² as desired.
Next, we will show that pn converges to p uniformly implies G(pn) converges to G(p)
in the Hausdor® metric. This, together with (i) will imply (ii). Consider any sequence pn
converging uniformly to p. Choose N such that n ¸ N implies d(pn(x);p(x)) · ². Hence,
for n ¸ N, (x;z) 2 G(pn) implies d((x;z);(x;p(x)) < ², proving limG(pn) ½ G(p) ½
limG(pn).
For µn 2 £n and n ¸ 0, let
£(µn) = fµ0 2 £jµ0(n) = µng
Lemma 4: Let ^ µ 2 £ 2 I with ^ µ = (f0;f1;:::) and Á(^ µ) = (f0;f). Then, for all n ¸ 1
and µn¡1 2 £n¡1,
S
µ2£(µn¡1) f(µ) = fn(µn¡1).
Proof: Let P 2 fn(µn¡1). Since the sequence f£ng is consistent, we may choose µn 2
£n(µn¡1) so that P 2 fn+1(µn). Repeat the argument for every k > n to obtain





µ2£(µn¡1) f(µ) ½ fn(µn¡1) follows from the de¯nition of f and the fact
that fn+1(µ) ½ fn(µ) for all n and all µ 2 £.
Lemma 5: Let X;Y be compact metric spaces and Z be an arbitrary metric space. Let
q : X £ Y ! Z and let the mapping p from X to the set of functions from Y to Z be
de¯ned as p(x)(y) := q(x;y). Then, q 2 C(X £ Y;Z) if and only if p 2 C(X;C(Y;Z)).
Proof: Assume q is continuous. Since X £ Y is compact, q must be uniformly contin-
uous. Hence, for all ² > 0 there exists ²0 > 0 such that d((x;y);(x0;y0)) < ²0 implies
d(q(x;y);q(x0;y0)) < ². In particular, d(x;x0) < ²0 implies d(q(x;y);q(x0;y)) < ² for all
y 2 Y . Hence, d(x;x0) < ²0 implies d(p(x);p(x0)) < ², establishing the continuity of p.
Next, assume that p is continuous and let ² > 0. To prove that q is continuous, assume
(xk;yk) 2 X £ Y converges to some (x;y) 2 X £ Y . The continuity of p ensures that for
some k 2 I N, m ¸ k implies d(p(xm);p(x)) · ². Since p(x) is continuous, we can choose k
so that d(p(x)(ym);p(x)(y)) < ² for all m ¸ k as well. Hence,
d(p(xm)(ym);p(x)(y)) · d(p(xm)(ym);p(x)(ym)) + d(p(x)(ym);p(x)(y)) < 2²
Lemma 6: Let X be compact and Z be an arbitrary metric space. Suppose p 2 C(X;Z)
is one-to-one. Then, p is a homeomorphism from X to p(X).
Proof: It is enough to show that p¡1 : p(X) ! X is continuous. Take any closed B ½ X.
Since X is compact, so is B. Then, (p¡1)¡1(B) = p(B) is compact (and therefore closed)
since the continuous image of a compact set is compact. Hence, the inverse image of any
closed set under p¡1 is closed and therefore p¡1 is continuous.
Lemma 7: Let X;Y be a compact metric spaces. For p 2 C(X;HY ), let ¹ d(p) =
maxx2X maxy;z2p(x) d(y;z). Then, (i) pn 2 C(X;HY ) converges to p 2 C(X;HY ) im-
plies limsup ¹ d(pn) · ¹ d(p). (ii) p;q;p0;q0 2 C(X;HY ) and p(x) ½ p0(x);q(x) ½ q0(x) for all
x 2 X implies d(p;q) · maxfd(p0;q0) + ¹ d(p0);d(p0;q0) + ¹ d(q0).
28Proof: Since X£Y is compact (i) is equivalent to the following: pn 2 C(X;HY ) converges
to p 2 C(X;HY ), lim ¹ d(pn) = ® implies ® · ¹ d(p). To prove this, choose xn 2 X and
yn;zn 2 pn(xn) such that d(yn;zn) = ¹ pn. Without loss of generality, assume (xn;yn;zn)
converges to (x;y;z). Since pn converges to p, for all ² > 0, there exists N such that
for all n ¸ N, there exists (x0
n;y0
n) and (^ xn; ^ zn) such that d((x0
n;y0
n);(xn;yn)) < ² and
d((^ xn; ^ zn);(xn;zn)) < ². Hence, we can construct a subsequence nj such that x0
nj; ^ xnj both
converge to x, y0
nj converges to y, ^ znj converges to z, and y0
nj 2 p(x0
nj); ^ znj 2 p(^ xnj) for all
nj. Since p 2 C(X;HY ) we conclude y;z 2 p(x). But ® = lim ¹ pn = limd(yn;zn) = d(y;z).
Hence, ® · ¹ d(p).
(ii) Let (x;z) 2 G(p);(^ x; ^ z) 2 G(p0). Then,
d((x;z);(^ x; ^ z)) · min
(^ x;^ y)2G(q0)




d((x;z);(^ x; ^ z)) · d(p0;q0) + ¹ d(q0)
and a symmetric argument shows that
min
(x;z)2G(p)
d((x;z);(^ x; ^ z)) · d(p0;q0) + ¹ d(p0)
Therefore, d(p;q) · maxfd(p0;q0) + ¹ d(p0);d(p0;q0) + ¹ d(q0)g.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1:
We ¯rst show that Á is continuous. Consider any sequence µk = (fk
0 ;fk
1 ;:::) 2 £
such that limµk = µ = (f0;f1 :::) 2 £. Let Á(µ) = (f0;f) and Á(µk) = (fk
0 ;fk) for all
k. Let µk = (fk
0 ;fk
1 ;:::), µ = (f0;f1;:::) and ² > 0. By Lemma 2 fn converges to f and
therefore by Lemma 7(i) there exists N such that ¹ d(fN) < ². Since fk
N ! fN Lemma
7(i) implies that there exists k0 such that for k ¸ k0, ¹ d(fk
N) · 2². Finally, there is k00
such that d(fk
N;fN) · ² for k > k00. Let m = maxfk0;k00g. Lemma 7(ii) now implies that
d(fk
n;fn)) · 3², for all n ¸ N and k ¸ m. Therefore d(fk;f) · 3² for all k ¸ m. This
shows that Á is continuous.
Next, we prove that Á is one-to-one. Pick any (f0;f1;:::);(g0;g1;:::) 2 £. Let
(f0;f) = Á(f0;f1;:::) and (g0;g) = Á(g0;:::). If f0 6= g0, then clearly (f0;f) 6= (g0;g).
29Hence, assume f0 = g0. Then, there exists a smallest n ¸ 1 and µn¡1 2 £n¡1 such that




µ02£(µn¡1) g(µ0) and hence f 6= g
as desired.
Since Á is continuous and one-to-one and £ is compact, it follows from Lemma 6 that
Á is a homeomorphism from £ to Á(£). The continuity of ª follows from the compactness
of £ and Lemma 5.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2:
We say that D is strongly continuous if the function ¾ : X ! D de¯ned by ¾(x) = Dx
is an element of C(X;HX).
Let M = (T;°;!) be an IPM. De¯ne the sequence of partitions Dn on T as follows:
Dt
0 = ft0 2 T j!(t0) = !(t)g
and D0 = fDt
0 jt 2 Tg. For n ¸ 1 we de¯ne inductively
Dt
n := ft0 2 Dt
n¡1 j¡(t0;D) = ¡(t;D) for all D 2 Dn¡1g
and Dn = fDt







and note that D is a partition of T.
Step 1: (i) Each Dn is continuous. (ii) M is valid if and only if D = fftgjt 2 Tg.
Proof: (i) The proof is by induction. Assume that tk converges to t, ^ tk 2 D
tk
0 and ^ tk
converges to ^ t. Then, !(^ t) = lim!(^ tk) = lim!(tk) = !(t). Hence, ^ t 2 Dt
0, proving
the strong continuity of D0. Assume that Dn is satis¯es strong continuity. Hence, every
D 2 Dn is compact. Assume that tk converges to t, ^ tk 2 D
tk
n+1 and ^ tk converges to
^ t. Hence, ^ tk 2 Dtk
n and by the strong continuity of Dn, we have ^ t 2 Dt
n. Pick any
D 2 Dn and P 2 ¡(^ t;D). By, Lemma 1(ii), we have Pn 2 ¡(^ tn;D) = ¡(tn;D) such that
limPn = P. Then, by Lemma 1(iii), we have P 2 ¡(t;D), proving that ¡(^ t;D) ½ ¡(t;D).
A symmetric argument ensured that ¡(^ t;D) = ¡(t;D), establishing that ^ t 2 Dt
n+1 and
proving the strong continuity of Dn+1. This concludes the proof of part (i).
If D 6= fftgjt 2 Tg, then M is not valid. Suppose M is not valid and hence there
exists a continuous partition D¤ that satis¯es (ii) in the de¯nition of validity, other than
30the ¯nest partition. Then, D¤ is a re¯nement of D; that is, D¤
t 2 D¤ and Dt 2 Dt implies
D¤
t ½ Dt. To see this note that since D¤ satis¯es (ii) in the de¯nition of validity it is a
re¯nement of D0. Moreover, if D¤ is a re¯nement of Dk then D¤ is a re¯nement of Dk+1.









Hence, D¤ is a re¯nement of Dk for all k ¸ 0. Hence, D¤










= Dt 2 D
This concludes the proof of step 1.
Let £0 := ­ = !(T). De¯ne ft
0 := !(t) and ¶0(t) := ft
0 for all t 2 T and de¯ne
inductively ft









£ = f(f0;f1;:::)j(f0;f1;:::;fn) 2 £n for all n ¸ 0g
¶(t) = (f0;f1;:::) such that (f0;f1;:::;fn) = ¶n(t) for all n:
Henceforth, for any t 2 T such that ¶(t) = (f0;f1;:::) Let ft
n denote the corresponding fn.
We de¯ne the functions gt




Fact 1: For all n, the functions ¶n are onto and continuous and the sets £n are non-empty
and compact.
Proof: We will prove inductively that £n are nonempty, compact, ¶n is continuous and
onto for every n. Clearly, this statement is true for n = 0. Suppose it is true for n. Then,
31by Lemma 1 parts (iii) and (iv), ¶n+1 2 C(£n;H) and £n+1 is compact. The functions ¶n
is onto by de¯nition.






Proof: Next, we show that ¶ : T ! £ is onto. Pick (f0;f1;:::) such that (f0;f1;:::;fn) 2
£n for all n. Then, for all n, there exists tn 2 T such that ¶n(tn) = (f0;f1;:::;fn). Take
tnj, a convergent subsequence of tn converging to some t 2 T. For all n and nj > n,
¶n(tnj) = (f0;f1;:::;fn). Hence, the continuity of ¶n ensures that ¶n(t) = (f0;f1;:::;fn)
for all n, establishing that ¶(T) = £.
Next, we prove that ¶n(t) = ¶n(s) if and only if Dt
n = Ds
n. To see this, note that for
n = 0, the assertion is true by de¯nition. Suppose, it is true for n. Then, if s 2 Dt
n+1, we
have s 2 Dt
n and ¡(t;Dn) = ¡(s;D) for all D 2 Dn. Hence, ft
n+1 = fs
n+1 and therefore,





n. Therefore,by the inductive hypothesis, s 2 Dt
n+1 2 Dn+1.
Part (iii) follows from part (ii) and the de¯nitions of gt
n;ft
n.
Fact 3: If M is valid then (i) gt = limgt
n is well de¯ned and continuous and (ii)
d(gtn
n ;g) ! 0 if tn ! t as n ! 1.
Proof: Part (i) follows from Lemma 2. For part (ii) ¯x ² > 0 and note that by Lemmas
3(i), 7(i) there exists N such that d(gt;gt
N) < ² and ¹ d(gt




By Lemma 7(i) we can choose m so that ¹ d(g
tk
N) · 2² for all n ¸ m. Therefore, by
Lemma 7(ii), d(gtn
n ;gn) < 3² for all n > maxfm;Ng. It follows that d(gtn
n ;g) < 4² for all
n > maxfm;Ng as desired.
Step 2: M is isomorphic to some £ 2 I if and only if D = fftgjt 2 Tg.
Fact 2(ii) implies that £n¡1(µn¡2) = ¶n¡1(Ds

















32proving that f£ng satis¯es the consistency condition.






Assume that M is valid and hence D = fftgjt 2 Tg. Since, ¶n(t) = ¶n(s) if and only if
Dt
n = Ds
n (Fact 2(ii)), we conclude that ¶ is one-to-one. For µ = (g0;g1;:::) we let µ(n) be
de¯ned as (g0;:::;gn). By Fact 2, ft
n(µ(n ¡ 1)) = gt
n(s) = ¡(t;Ds
n) for µ = ¶(s). It follows
that ft(µ) = ¡(t;s) and therefore ft is a singleton.
To prove that ¶ is a homeomorphism, we prove that ¶ is continuous and appeal to
Lemma 6. Consider tk converging to t. It follows from Fact 3 that for any two subsequences
of natural numbers n(j), k(j) both converging to 1, g
tk(j)
n(j) converges to gt. Recall that d¤
is the sup metric. It follows from Lemma 3(i) that g
tk(j)
n(j) converges to gt in the sup metric
d¤ as well. Hence, for any ² > 0, there exits N such that k ¸ N, n ¸ N, d¤(gtk
n ;g) < ².
Since each ¶n is continuous, we can choose k > N large enough so that d(fk
n;fn) < ² for





n;g) + d¤(g;gn) · 2²







Hence £ is isomorphic to M as desired.
Next we will show that if M is isomorphic to some £, then the function ¶ de¯ned
above is the isomorphism. Let ^ ¶ : T ! £ be an isomorphism and ^ ¶n denote the n¡the
coordinate function of ^ ¶. Recall that ¶ de¯ned above satis¯es the property
¶n(t) = ¶n(s) if and only if Dt
n = Ds
n (A1)
Note that this property uniquely identi¯es the function ¶. That is, if ^ ¶ is any function
that also satis¯es (A1), ^ ¶ = ¶. To see this note that if ^ ¶0 satis¯es (A1) then obviously,
33^ ¶0 = ! = ¶0. Then, a simple inductive step yields the desired conclusion. To see that
^ ¶ satis¯es (A1), note that since it is a isomorphism, we have ! = ^ ¶0 and hence (A1) is
satis¯ed for n = 0, Suppose it is satis¯ed for n. Then, suppose ^ ¶n+1(t) = ^ ¶n+1. Since
^ ¶ is an isomorphism, we conclude ft
n+1 = fs
n+1. Then, the inductive hypothesis yields
Dt
n+1 = Ds
n+1. Conversely, suppose Dt
n+1 = Ds
n+1. Then, ¡(t;Dn) = ¡(s;Dn) for all
Dn 2 Dn. Since, ^ ¶ is an isomorphism, we conclude Ã(^ ¶(t);^ ¶(Dn)) = Ã(^ ¶(t);^ ¶(Dn)) for all
Dn 2 Dn. Which, by the inductive hypothesis, yields ^ ¶n+1(t) = ^ ¶n+1(s).
Suppose s 2 Dt
n 2 Dn for all n. Since ¶ is an isomorphism, we have
ft
n(¶(Dn)) = Ã(¶(t);¶(Dn)) = ¡(t;Dn) = ¡(s;Dn) = Ã(¶(s);¶(Dn)) = fs
n(¶(Dn))
for all n;Dn 2 Dn. By (A1), we have ¶(t) = ¶(s). Since ¶ is one-to-one, we conclude s = t.
This concludes the proof of step 2.
Theorem 1 and Step 1 imply that any component of the canonical types space is a
valid IPM. Steps 1 and 2 imply that any valid IPM is isomorphic to a component of the
canonical type space.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Algebras and partitions can be represented as functions: Let h : S ! X be any
onto function. This h yields the partition Th = fh¡1(x)jx 2 Xg and the algebra Ah :=
fh¡1(V )jV ½ Xg. Conversely, for any partition T , the canonical mapping ¿ of T (that
is, h : S ! T such that h(s) is the unique element of T that contains s) represents T in
this sense: T¿ = T . When there is no risk of confusion, we will use a partition of T and
its canonical mapping ¿ interchangeably. Note also that for any algebra A, ¿A, the set
of minimal elements in Anf;g is a partition and ¿A interpreted as the canonical mapping
represents A; that is, A = A¿A.
Let h : S ! X and k : S ! Y be two onto functions and de¯ne (h;k)(s) = (h(s);k(s))
for all s and h ¤ k : S ! Z for Z ½ 2Y be the onto function de¯ned by h ¤ k(s) =
k(h¡1(h(s))).
Fact: For any two onto function h;k on S, Ah _ Ak = A(h;k) and Ah¤k = Th ¤ Ak.
34Proof: The proof of the ¯rst assertion is straightforward. To prove the second assertion,
we will show that (i) Ah¤k contains Th ¤ A for all A 2 Ak and therefore, it contains
Th ¤ Ak and (ii) for every x 2 (h ¤ k)(S), there exist A1;:::;An 2 Th ¤ Ak such that
Tn
m=1 Am = (h ¤ k)¡1(x). (Hence, Th ¤ Ak contains Th¤k and therefore it contains Ah¤k.)
For (i), let B = Th ¤ A. Hence, there exist V ½ h(S) and W ½ k(S) such that (a)
for all x 2 V , h(s) = x implies k(s) 2 W and (b) for all x = 2 V there exist s0 such that
h(s0) = x and k(s0) = 2 W, and (c) B = h¡1(V ). To establish that B 2 Ah¤k, we will show
that s 2 B and (h ¤ k)(s) = (h ¤ k)(^ s) implies ^ s 2 B. Suppose s 2 B and ^ s = 2 B. Then, by
(a) above (h ¤ k)(s) ½ W and by (b) there exists s0 such that h(s0) = h(^ s) and k(s0) = 2 W.
Hence, (h ¤ k)(s) 6= (h ¤ k)(^ s) as desired.
To prove (ii), suppose x 2 (h¤k)(S). Hence, x ½ k(S) and x 6= ;. Let B = (h¤k)¡1(x).
Let fx2;:::;xng be an enumeration of the set of all nonempty subsets of x. De¯ne
A1 = fs 2 S jk(^ s) 2 x 8^ s 2 h(s)g
Am = fs 2 S j there exists ^ s 2 h(s) such that k(^ s) = 2 xg
for m = 2;:::;n. Note that A1 = T ¤ k¡1(x), Am = T ¤ (Snk¡1(xm)) for m > 1, and
B =
Tn
m=1 Am as desired.
For any IPM (T;°), we can construct an equivalent IPM-EF fS;T1;T2;ºg as fol-
lows: S = T £ T, T1 = fftg £ T jt 2 Tg, T2 = fT £ ftgjt 2 Tg, and º(t1;t2) =
(°(t1;t2;);°(t2;t1)). Let ³1(t) = ftg£T;³2(t) = T £ftg. Hence, E is equivalent to (T;°).
An algebra A is symmetric if A 2 A implies f(t2;t1) 2 S j(t1;t2) 2 Ag 2 A. Let ¤ be
the lattice of all symmetric algebras. The set ¤Lp := f ^ L 2 ¤jLp ½ Lg is a sublattice of
¤ and F is an increasing function on ¤Lp; that is,
L0 ½ L00 implies F(L0) ½ F(L00)
For L 2 ¤, the algebra G(L) 2 ¤L is a ¯xed-point of F. Let ^ L 2 ¤Lp be a ¯xed-point of F.
Hence, L1 ½ ^ L and therefore L2 = F(L1) ½ F( ^ L) = ^ L. By induction, G(L) ½ F( ^ L) = ^ L.
Hence, G(L) is the smallest ¯xed-point of F in ¤Lp.
Let A¤ 2 ¤ denote the richest algebra; i.e., fsg 2 A¤ for all s 2 S. Obviously,
A¤ is a ¯xed-point of F and is the largest ¯xed point. If T1 [ T2 ½ CLp, then A¤ =
35A(T1 [T2) ½ CLp ½ G(Lp). Hence, A¤ is both the largest and smallest ¯xed-point of F in
¤Lp. So, if T1[T2 can be communicated in Lp, then A¤ is the only ¯xed-point of F in ¤Lp.
Conversely, if A¤ is the only ¯xed-point in ¤Lp, then G(Lp) = A¤. Since, Ti ¤A¤ = Ti, we
have CLp = T1 _T2 = A¤ and therefore T1 [T2 ½ CLp. Hence, the proposition is equivalent
to the statement that A¤ is the only ¯xed-point of F in ¤Lp.
Suppose L 6= A¤ is a ¯xed-point of F in ¤Lp. Then, Ti ¤ L 6= A(Ti). Let h1;h2;k be
functions such that Th1 = T1 and Ak = L. Consider the partition D induced on T by the
function h1 ¢ ³1. By symmetry, this is the same partition as the one induced by h2 ¢ ³2.
Since Ti ¤ L 6= A(Ti), D 6= fftgjt 2 Tg. Since L is a ¯xed point of F, we can assume
k = (º;h1 ¤ k;h2 ¤ k) (A2)
Choose t0 2 Dt, the element of D that contains t. Hence,
k(h
¡1
2 (h2(t;t¤))) = k(h
¡1
2 (h2(t0;t¤))) (A3)








) = k(ft0g £ Dt
¤
)
Proving that for all T ¤, there exists ¹ t 2 Dt
¤
such that k(t0;¹ t) = k(t;t¤) and therefore
º(t0;¹ t) = º(t;t¤). Hence, (T;°) is not valid .
For the converse, let D be a partition other than the ¯nest that satis¯es (ii) in the
de¯nition of validity. De¯ne h1(t;t¤) = f(t0;t00)jt0 2 Dtg and h2(t¤;t) = f(t00;t0)jt0 2 Dtg.
It is easy to verify that A(º;h1;h2) 6= A¤ and A(º;h1;h2) 2 ¤Lp is a ¯xed-point of F.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 4
For any ordered IPM (T;±), let ¢(t;t0) = (±(t;t0);±(t0;t)). Then, the de¯nition validity
for an ordered IPM replaces ¡ with ¢.
Lemma 9: Let M = (T;±) be a simple IPM and suppose ± is nondecreasing in both
arguments. Then, M is a reciprocity model if and only if ±(x;¢) = ±(z;¢) implies x = y.
36Proof: Let M = (T;±) be a simple IPM and assume ± is nondecreasing in both argument
but ±(x;¢) = ±(z;¢) for some x 6= y. Then, de¯ne the partition D as follows: for y = 2 fx;zg,
Dy = fyg, and Dx = Dz = fx;zg. It follows that ±(x;¢) = ±(z;¢) and therefore ±(¢;x) =
±(¢;z) and hence ¢(w;D) = ¢(w0;D) for all w 2 T, w0 2 Dw, and D 2 D. Hence, M is
not valid.
Next, suppose that M is not valid. Then, there exists a partition D of K such that
(i) there is D 2 D and x;z 2 D such that x 6= z, (ii) ¢(w;D) = ¢(w0;D) for all w 2 K,
w0 2 Dw, and D 2 D. Let ¹ D denote the closure of D. The continuity of ¢ ensures that
¢(w; ¹ D2) = ¢(w0; ¹ D2) (A4)
for all w;w0 2 ¹ D1 and D1;D2 2 D. To see this, take w;w0 2 ¹ D1 and y 2 ¹ D2. By
de¯nition, there exists a sequence (wn;w0
n;yn) 2 D1 £ D1 £ D2 converging to (w;w0;y).
Moreover, there exists y0
n 2 D2 such that ¢(wn;yn) = ¢(w0
n;y0
n) for all n. Since ¹ D2
is compact, y0
n has a convergent subsequence that converges to some y0 2 ¹ D2. Assume,
without loss of generality, that this subsequence is y0
n itself. Then, the continuity of ¢
ensures ¢(w;y) = ¢(w0;y0) and proves (A4).
The weak monotonicity of ± in both arguments together with (A4) implies
¢(max ¹ D1;max ¹ D2) = ¢(min ¹ D1;max ¹ D2) = ¢(min ¹ D1;min ¹ D2)
Then, monotonicity of ¢ ensures ±(w;y) = ±(w0;y) for all y 2 K whenever w;w0 2 ¹ D, in
particular, for w = x and w0 = z.
Lemma 9 establishes that any simple increasing IPM is a reciprocity model. Next,
suppose M = (T;±) is a reciprocity model. By de¯nition, º, the nicer than relation is
transitive and since M is reciprocity model it is also complete. The continuity of ° yields
the continuity of º. Since T is a compact metric space, it is separable and hence there
exists a continuous real-valued function x : T ! I R that represents º. Let K := x(T) =
fx(t)jt 2 Tg. Let Dt = ft0 2 T jx(t0) = x(t)g and D = fDt jt 2 Tg. Clearly, D is a
partition of T such that ±(t0;¢) = ±(t;¢) for all t0 2 Dt. Since every type reciprocates,
±(¢;t0) = ±(¢;t) for all t0 2 Dt and therefore ¢(t;D) = ¢(t0;D) for all t 2 T, t0 2 Dt and
D 2 d. Since M is valid, each Dt is a singleton and therefore x is one-to-one. Then, the
37compactness of T ensures that K is compact and that x is a homeomorphism. De¯ne,
±(w;y) = ±(x¡1(w);x¡1(y)) for all w;y 2 K. Since x and ± are continuous, so is ±0. It
follows that (K;±0) is isomorphic to M and therefore is valid. Since x represent º and
every type in M reciprocates, ±0 is weakly increasing in both arguments. Finally, Lemma
9 and the validity of M imply (K;±0) is increasing.
7.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Verifying the validity of M0
k and M1
k is straightforward. To prove the converse, let
(T0;±0) be a valid binary symmetric model with ±0(x;y) 2 f0;1g for all x;y 2 T0 and
consider the mapping ´± : T0 ! C(T0;f0;1g) de¯ned by ´±(x)(y) = ±0(x;y). Since ±0 is
continuous, so is ´±0. Hence, ´±(T0) is compact and therefore ¯nite.
Then, without loss of generality, assume T0 = f1;:::;mg. We will prove the result by
induction. If k = 1, the result is obvious. Suppose that the result is true for k = m and
assume m = k + 1 and hence T0 = f1;:::;k + 1g. Validity ensures that ±0(t;¢) is constant
for some t 2 T0. Suppose this constant is 1 and t = k + 1. (The proof for the case in
which this constant is 0 is symmetric and will be omitted.) Let T = T0nftg and let ± be
the restriction of ±0 to T £ T.
First, we argue that (T;±) must be a valid binary symmetric IPM. If not, there exist
a some partition other than the ¯nest that satis¯es (ii) in the de¯nition of validity. Then,
let D0 = D [ ffT gg and note that D0 proves that (T0;±0) is not valid, a contradiction.
Hence, by the inductive hypothesis, we can assume that T = f1;:::;kg and either ± = ±k
or ± = ±k+1. In the former case, we have ±0(k;t0) = ±(k + 1;t0) = 1 for all t0 2 T0,
contradicting the validity of (T0;±0). In the latter case, we have (T0;±0) = M0
k+1 as desired.
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